Hostile Rhetoric Following Charlie Kirk’s Assassination
In the hours following the assassination of Charlie Kirk at a Utah event on Wednesday, social media platforms—especially X—saw an explosion of aggressive language. Right-leaning posts quickly began using terms like “war,” “civil war,” and made calls for retribution directed at liberals, Democrats, and “the left.”
Among these posts were collections of accounts displaying remarkably similar features: generic bios, MAGA-style identifiers, “NO DMs” disclaimers, patriotic imagery, and stock or unremarkable profile pictures.
These trends have sparked increasing suspicion: Are bot networks being deployed to amplify right-wing demands for civil war?
As of now, no concrete reports or agencies have verified a coordinated bot-driven effort specifically related to the incident. However, circumstantial evidence, historical context, and studies related to the behavior of inauthentic accounts on X indicate that there are valid reasons for concern.
Researchers and users have noted identical phrasing (for example, warnings that “the left” will pay, “this is war,” or “you have no idea what is coming”) appearing repeatedly across many posts in a short period. A significant number of these posts originate from low-engagement accounts that feature default or generic profiles.
Branislav Slantchev, a political science professor at the University of San Diego, stated on X, “In the wake of the assassination of Charlie Kirk, we are going to see a lot of accounts pushing, effectively, for civil war in the U. S. This includes the rage-baiter-in-chief, Elon Musk, but also an army of Russian and Chinese bots and their faithful shills in the West.”
He referenced a viral thread of posts from supposed bot users advocating for retributive violence. The original poster claimed that “half of them have an AI-generated profile photo, the standard bio schlop, and the standard banners.”
Such trends—the rapid emergence of similar content across numerous accounts—align with established botnet coordination or message amplification. Although these conclusions stem from user observations rather than systematic data, their consistency with known bot behavior lends credence to these suspicions.
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Understanding Bot-Ampified Content
Prior research provides a foundation for identifying what bot-amplified political content resembles on X (previously Twitter). A Plos One study conducted in February revealed that after Elon Musk’s acquisition of the platform in late 2022, incidences of hate speech surged, and there was no decline in inauthentic or “bot-like” accounts.
Additionally, an investigation by Global Witness last summer uncovered a small group of bot-like accounts (specifically, 45 accounts in one instance) that collectively generated over 4 billion impressions for partisan, conspiratorial, or abusive content. This type of amplification highlights the potential reach of such networks.
Moreover, there is a known history of states or organized groups utilizing botnets or troll farms to exploit political division in the U.S. Examples include Russia’s Doppelgänger campaign, operations linked to China’s “Spamouflage,” and others that have imitated U.S. users, utilized AI-generated or manipulated content, or promoted divisive rhetoric for political gain.
Currently, no reputable cybersecurity firm, government organization, or academic group has confidently attributed a bot network—either foreign or domestic—to the surge of “civil war” rhetoric that followed Kirk’s death.
It also remains unclear how many of the posts are automated compared to those made by actual users. The fraction coming from seemingly bot-like accounts versus the wider public discourse is unknown. Furthermore, it has not been established whether any amplification has a centralized command structure (i.e., is centrally coordinated) or if it’s more spontaneous.
Moreover, X is filled with verified influencers on the right calling for civil war or advocating violent actions against the left.
Nonetheless, when the U.S. experiences a national tragedy such as the recent shooting, groups skilled at exploiting political polarization have been known to take advantage of the situation. Russia’s bot farms (e.g., operations like the Internet Research Agency/“Storm” type) have been long identified. Disinformation networks linked to China (such as “Spamouflage”) are documented for using social media amplification and content farming to sway U.S. public opinion.
The rise of AI-powered content generation also facilitates the ability of bot networks to create seemingly plausible, human-like posts at scale. Research indicates that detecting bots is becoming increasingly challenging due to accounts that replicate human language, timing, and variability. A recent review of bot detection identified evolving concealment strategies and gaps in existing detection methodologies.
